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360 abstract 
A view prominently expounded is that the interaction between the composition and 
the volume of public expenditures is directly affected by political, institutional, 
psephological and ideological indicators. A crucial component of public expendi-
tures, social expenditures play an important role in the economy as they directly 
and indirectly affect the distribution of income and wealth. Social expenditures 
aim at reallocating income and wealth unequal distribution. These expenditures 
comprise cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax 
breaks with social purposes.
The aim of this study is to determine the relationship between political struc-
ture, i.e. government fragmentation, ideological composition, elections and so on, 
and the social expenditures in Greece. Employing data from the Comparative Po-
litical Dataset (CPDS) and the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), a 
time series analysis was conducted for Greece for the 1980-2014 period. The 
findings of the study indicate that voter turnout, spending on the elderly popula-
tion and the number of government changes have positive and statistically sig-
nificant effects on social expenditures in Greece while debt stock and cabinet com-
position have negative effects.
Keywords: social expenditures, political indicators, time series analyses
1 IntroductIon
Until the Great Depression began in August 1929, the role and responsibility 
given to the public sector by the fiscal traditionalist view was rather limited. This 
approach, which holds the duties, powers and responsibilities of the public sector 
in a narrow framework, rejected the concept of the “welfare state” in particular 
and did not consider the role of public policy aiming to equalise the distribution of 
income and wealth as a primary function. However, social expenditures became 
prominent as the Keynesian view dominated economic theory, stating that public 
sector expenditures on social welfare in different countries of the world are effi-
cient instruments to achieve a fair distribution of income and wealth. With the 
general acceptance of this viewpoint, social expenditures were perceived as they 
indisputably are, as the main task of the public sector. The fact that these expendi-
tures increased considerably in the 1960s tended to increase the importance of the 
concept of “welfare state”. Welfare states devote resources to education, health-
care and social protection, transfers to low-income groups being particularly 
prominent in this context. 
The size and composition of social spending is influenced by many financial, eco-
nomic, social and political variables. Numerous theoretical and applied studies 
indicate that the size and composition of social expenditures are influenced by 
many fiscal, economic, social and political variables. This study focuses on the 
political determinants of social expenditures in Greece for the 1980-2014 period. 
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361opment, and the second part on the political determinants of social expenditures. 
In the next section, the structure and development of social expenditures in Greece 
are examined. In the empirical part of the study, time series analysis aims at show-
ing the effects of the indicators determining the political structure on the volume 
of social expenditures in Greece for the period of 1980-2014.
2 socIal eXPendItures and tHeIr HIstorIcal deVeloPMent
In about 1930, some countries began to support a significant increase in social 
expenditures, such as unemployment benefits, pensions, health spending, and edu-
cation spending, which influenced public welfare; other countries pursued poli-
cies with a minimum of social spending aimed at supporting a redistribution of 
income (educational spending excepted). The reason for this opposition can be 
attributed to the relatively different quantitative histories of countries and their 
political economies (Lindert, 1994; 1996).
During the 19th century and the First World War, the share of tax revenue in the 
national income was around 10%. With this limited budgetary revenue, the states 
fulfilled their primary tasks, while the volume of public services such as education 
and health was restricted. Political constraints can explain the low social spending 
in this century (Lindert, 2004:22). Regarding the political process in this period, 
the regulation of some restrictions in Europe in the late 19th century was observed, 
provided that the right to vote and the conduct of policies for social spending and 
increasingky redistributive income was limited to landowners and income-earn-
ing males. 
After the Great Depression of 1929, in many countries the share of tax revenue in 
national income increased and “the return of the state” occurred. The social func-
tions undertaken by the state brought the concept of welfare state into the litera-
ture and the importance of social expenditures began to be discussed (Piketty, 
2015:514-516). In this process, with the assumption that all adult citizens had an 
equal and single voice in the political decision-making process, the pursuit the 
franchise and equal citizenship in the process of political decision-making ena-
bled universalization of the right to vote and transmission of social demands to 
parliaments in the 20th century.
The intervention area of the welfare state is defined by Cochrane and Clarke 
(1993) as social security and social services. Briggs (1961), on the other hand, 
refers to a more comprehensive definition and states that the government must act 
in three ways in this manner. The areas of intervention of the welfare state are the 
provision of social services, meeting social needs and ensuring minimum living 
standards for the family and the individual. Mishra (1999) defines the welfare 
state as a middle way between socialism and capitalism. Esping-Andersen (1990) 
defines the welfare state, in a broader definition, as a set of institutional arrange-
ments and rules that shape current social policy decisions, spending patterns, solu-
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362 it is possible to say that this kind of view of the nature of the welfare state has 
widened the scope of the tasks with which government is charged and that govern-
ments have had to fund an increase in social spending.
In the third quarter of the 20th century, there was a turning point in countries in 
which the tendency towards solidarity decreased and neo-liberal policies came into 
prominence. In this period, the world was faced with many problems such as infla-
tion in the USA, the Vietnam War, oil crises and stagflation crisis. As the cause of 
these problems was not the welfare state policy pursued, the solution should not 
have been criticism of the welfare state (Stiglitz, 2015). Despite the perception that 
developments, international competition, supply-side policies and the more rapidly 
globalizing world were treated as the end of the welfare state by some researchers 
(Özdemir, 2007), with the World Bank’s 1997 Report called “Changing State in 
the World”, an effective understanding of the state was adopted once again and an 
understanding of the facilitator state was adopted (World Bank, 1997).
3 lIMIts and PolItIcal deterMInants of socIal eXPendItures
In the literature, Alesina and Perotti (1996) have been highly influential with their 
definition of “budgetary institutions” in studies examining the effects of political 
indicators and political structure on public finance. According to this definition, 
budgetary institutions are are all rules and regulations which are in control of the 
design, approval and implementation of the budget. These conditions led to the 
endogeneity of budgetary institutions. Budgetary institutions can change, espe-
cially if the fiscal performance is not at an expected level or if it is a function of 
different social/political/historical variables that affect elections and fiscal perfor-
mance indicators among different budget agencies. Milesi-Ferretti (1996) aggre-
gated studies on budgetary institutions in two main groups. Contributions in the 
first group focused on constitutionally balanced budgetary amendments, interna-
tional agreements, convergence criteria such as the Maastricht Criteria, macroeco-
nomic program criteria, and statutory upper limits on public debt while the studies 
in the second group focused on budgetary procedures, spending ministers repre-
senting the interests of a particular electoral district, the role of budgetary institu-
tions, the effects of the privilege of different ministers, parliamentarians, pressure 
groups and public institutions. Von Hagen (1992) and Von Hagen and Harden 
(1995), claim that the performance of public finance is related to two factors: 
principal-agent and common pool problems. According to the authors, these are 
the factors that directly result in increases in public expenditures.
To examine the political reflection of the concept of welfare, Spicker (2003) exam-
ines the most rough expression of the concepts of  “left” and “right” in two separate 
perspectives. While the left wing supports the welfare state, social spending and an 
active state, the right wing is individualist and adopts the residual welfare state con-
ception (Özdemir, 2007). This political reflection, of course, also affects social ex-
penditure policies. It is possible to say that the level of social expenditure policies 
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363political reasons behind this dispute. In this study, the change discussed and ana-
lysed above in the context of political science, is studied in the perspective of po-
litical determinants. These political determinants can be aggregated as political frac-
tionalization, party ideology and electoral systems and periods.
3.1 PolItIcal fractIonalIzatIon
Political fractionalization, one of the political determinants of public expendi-
tures, is associated with the number of parties that have representatives in parlia-
ment, the number of ministers in the cabinet and the ministers’ party and member-
ship status.
It is possible to explain political fractionalization by the “common pool problem”. 
In a coalition consisting of N politicians, a politician will try to maximize the in-
terests of his constituency (Le Maux et al., 2011), which will lead to an increase 
in public expenditures. In a coalition consisting of N politicans, different fractions 
indicate different numbers of budgetary demands and different interests.
Geys (2004) deals political fractionalization in two aspects, namely, voter and deci-
sion-maker perspective. Political fractionalization corresponds to the number of al-
ternatives proposed by the politicians, or in other words the number of parties com-
peting in the election. The voter can choose between options p1 and pN. For deci-
sion-makers, political fragmentation corresponds to scattered political power (Ales-
ina and Rosenthal, 1995) or to a coalition. A politician discusses and evaluates the 
demands placed between p1 and pN within the framework of public policies and 
applies a policy choice to the current problem by going to a common decision. 
Weingast, Kenneth and Christopher (1981) emphasize that the fractionalization 
process in the decision-making process has a significant impact on public ex-
penditure. Since there are different interests from a geographical point of view, it 
is difficult to choose the most suitable project from the political point of view, 
which emphasizes the importance of the institutions and rules in the process. 
According to Ricciuti (2004), political fractionalization is based on the fiscal poli-
cies of the 1980s. The financing of public activities and the scope of fiscal policy 
instruments are shaped by political actors. The lack of time optimization between 
public deficits, the amount of debt, the collection of taxes and the making of expen-
ditures in the 1980s caused social welfare costs. From this point of view, the concept 
of political fractionalization, which partially regulates fiscal policy, has begun to be 
take the place in discussions of the benevolent state that tries to increase social wel-
fare. Ricciuti (2004) categorises political fragmentations in terms of the number of 
fragmentations, institutional fragmentation and temporal fragmentation. 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) argue that instability may arise in the fiscal policies 
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364 integration, or, in other words, the greater the political fractionalization, the greater 
the public expenditure, and therefore the likelihood of a budget deficit arising.
Lijphart (1984, 1999) concludes that there is a relationship between political frac-
tionalization and tax policies, while coalition governments follow a more optimis-
tic government policy. In support of this view, there are also studies that have 
found that bipartite party coalitions have higher public expenditure than single-
party governments (Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002).
3.2 PartY IdeoloGY
The relative strengths and ideological differences of the parties place importance 
on the share of the budget allocated for social welfare policies in the national in-
come. It is not only the power of government, but also the ideology of parties, the 
number of seats in the assembly, the power of the opposition and the weight of the 
coalition of the parties and the weight of the parliaments that affect social expen-
ditures, thereby affecting welfare (Hicks and Swank, 1992:668).
The concepts of “right” and “left”, which has been used to express ideological 
divergence for 200 years, are used to indicate the contrast of thought and actions 
of political parties (Bobbio, 1996). According to Cameron (1985), the concept of 
ideology is based on the 1789 French Revolution. The division of the parliament, 
which is frequently discussed in the political science literature, into a left wing 
and a right wing, influenced the session of the French parliament.
From an economic point of view, the concepts of left and right wing are correlated 
with the need for state intervention and the free market, respectively. The left wing 
focuses on low income groups and the concept of labor, preferring income redis-
tribution policies, while those on the right side argue that redistribution of income 
policies product a substitution effect, therefore these expenditures should be lim-
ited (Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987).
Cameron (1985) reached the conclusion that with the increase in the number of 
delegates on the left-hand side in the assembly for the period of 1960-1975 and an 
increase was observed in gross domestic product and public expenditures. As a 
result, left wing had higher public expenditures than right-wing governments.
Rose (1984) opposed the view that it is the difference in party ideology that influ-
ences spending policies. The study of Rose (1984) indicates that there is a very 
small difference between the parties in terms of the volume of public expenditures 
and that the effect of ideology on public expenditure is insignificant. He supported 
this viewpoint with the increase in public spending during the periods each gov-
ernment was in power in England from 1957 to 1982, the rate of increase during 
the Labor Party periods being less than in periods in which the Conservative Party 
was in power. According to the author, party which win election can change the 
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365spending commitments will put pressure on party groups and that public spending 
will not change significantly.
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) assessed a situation in which two different party 
ideologies or decision makers have different views on the total level of public 
spending rather than on the composition of government expenditures. While “con-
servative” policymakers prefer reducing public spending not to have budget defi-
cit, liberal policy makers are following policies aimed at achieving a budget sur-
plus. In addition, different experiences and political fractionalization of countries 
indicate that public expenditure influences the flexibility of the political decision-
making process. 
Hicks and Swank (1992), Hicks and Misra (1993) examined the effects of ideo-
logical differences on social spending. They pointed out that social spending in-
creases during periods when left and center parties are in power; Solano (1983) 
has concluded that there is no link between social expenditures and ideological 
changes.
Kittel and Obinger (2002) employed cross-section regression analysis to discover 
the relationship between the long-term impact of political parties and institutional 
constraints. Their findings indicate that secular conservative parties supports so-
cial expenditures, while the positive impact of leftist parties is fragile and Chris-
tian democratic parties are conservative in social expenditures.
3.3 electoral sYsteMs and PerIods 
The effect of policies on the economy was first examined by Nordhaus (1975), 
who has introduced into the literature the concept of political business cycles. In 
his work, Nordhaus notes that the politician who wants to be elected again, or who 
has the desire to win the election and the vote-maximizing mentality, tends to fa-
vour higher public expenditure. Rogoff (1990) states that in the election periods, 
politicians invest in expenditure items that the voter can visually see, and aim to 
win the votes of the median voter. Undoubtedly, social spending is also an impor-
tant expenditure component that affects voters’ voting decisions.
In his study of the relationship between social welfare spending and election peri-
ods in the US between 1960-1978, Tufte (1978) points out that there is a signifi-
cant increase in transfer payments such as old-age pensions, disability and insur-
ance payments and social security expenditures during the election period. Hicks 
and Swank (1992) argue that the competition in the election period has strength-
ened the social welfare considerations. On the other hand, some part of the litera-
ture shows that the competition in the election period is not a factor that has much 
effect on social expenditures (Lago-Penas and Lago-Penas, 2009).
Electoral systems are divided into proportional and majority systems. In propor-
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366 receive, while in the majority system, the party that receives the most votes has the 
largest number of parliamentary seats. Iverson and Sockice (2006) investigated 
the relationship between social spending patterns and electoral systems, and found 
that social spending is more prevalent in the proportional than in the majority 
election system. Jurado (2014) emphasizes that party systems have a positive in-
fluence on social spending; Jurado and Leon (2013) point out that in the majoritar-
ian electoral system, politicians are more sensitive to citizens who demand social 
spending in narrow regions and that social spending in the majoritarian electoral 
system is higher than the relative election system.
4 socIal eXPendItures In Greece
Greece’s social modernization program which is “the Mediterranean welfare 
state” (Tinios, 2015) gained importance because its accession to the European 
Union in 1981. Within this period, an egalitarian policy for the redistribution of 
income was accepted, extending social insurance coverage, improving access to 
social services and eliminating regional inequalities. In the last thirty years, the 
level of social expenditure in Greece has increased rapidly, reaching a limit. Graph 
1 compares social expenditures as a percentage of GDP in Greece and OECD 
countries for the 1980-2014 period.
graph 1 
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Greece OECD
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX).
As indicated by graph 1, social expenditures in Greece in the 1980s were lower than 
the average of OECD countries. However, between 1980-1982, there was a signifi-
cant increase in Greece and this rise continued in the 1982-1987 period. The major 
reason behind this increase was the health reform program in 1983. During the 
PASOK government (Pan Hellenic Socialist Party), the health system was revised 
and social security expenditures were raised (Sakellaridis, 2009). In the same period, 
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367From the graph 1 a decrease in social expenditure is observed in Greece in the 
1985-1988 period. In this time interval, the PASOK government began to pursue 
a right wing policy in economy and aimed at reducing the budget deficit and infla-
tion (Sakellaridis, 2009). These restrictive policies caused a reduction of the share 
of social spending in total government expenditures.
The 1989-1990 period was witness to political instability in Greece. In 1990 the 
New Democratic Party came to power and remained in power until 1993 (Sakel-
laridis, 2009). With neoliberal policies in most of the world in this period, privati-
zation and liberalization policies were also experienced in Greece. These neolib-
eral policies affected social policy and there was a decrease social expenditure 
rate in 1990-1991.
The period between 1991-1997 included dramatic increase in social expenditures 
in Greece. This situation can be linked to social security expenditures. While in 
1981 each person who had a job used social expenditure provided by the govern-
ment, in 1990 anyone who had a job at home or was part time employee was also 
able to benefit from the social security network. In addition, in 1996, Law No. 
2434 on “Policy Measures for Employment and Vocational Education and Train-
ing and Other Provisions” was enacted. It provided that the government make a 
payment each month for low income pensioners regardless of the age limit and 
elders who did not receive a salary (OECD, 2013). Due to the social security re-
form in 1996, in Law No. 2434, the population is included in the social security 
network increased, and this increase led to an increase in social expenditues.
As inferred from graph 1, the greatest rises in social expenditures can be observed 
after 2004. The most important reason for that was that Greek National Reform 
Programme (NRP) was signed by European Commission. That programme em-
phasized fiscal consolidation, public administration modernization, employment, 
education and increasing the importance of lifelong learning. Social policies 
gained in importance via that programme and the share of social expenditures in 
total expenditures were increased (Yfantopoulos, 2010).
In accordance with this report, the government published the Greek National 
Strategy Report on Pensions in 2005, the aim of which was to set out a rational 
and objective pensions reform. After this reform, measures to solve the problem 
of social security were taken and several banking sector funds were created. The 
main policies were an increase in the minimum pension age and the requirement 
for people to stay longer in active employment (OECD, 2013). 
Greece reached the limit of its social expenditure with the 2008 crisis, and the 
number of funds in the social security system was reduced from 130 to 13. These 
13 funds still cover the majority of the population. Furthermore, the Manpower 
Employment Organisation (OAED), an independent institution as a part of Minis-
try of Labor, Social Security and Welfare, provides unemployment insurance and 
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368 While the poverty rate in the country in 2009 was 19.6%, this ratio has risen to 
36% by 2014, with the economic recession and austerity measures (EUROSTAT, 
2017). After the crisis, the unemployment rate in Greece tripled from 8.5% in 
2007 to 26.7% in 2014 (EUROSTAT, 2017). The 2008 crisis and austerity policies 
led to an increase in the rate of poverty in the country and it has caused a signifi-
cant rise in the number of people who are social assistance recipients.
The share of social expenditures was about 26% of GDP in 2014 in Greece. While 
the share of pension and social security expenditures was 22% of GDP, the other 
expenditures remained at 4% of GDP. The highest rate of pension and social secu-
rity is a critical issue. The Greek pension system is a “pay as you go”. In this 
system, current contributions collected from workers are for current pensioners. It 
is also based on pension funds. But in Greece this pension policy was not success-
fully implemented. Although some groups, who are subject to a lower retirement 
age, such as 42 or 50, and have low contribution rates, generous and high replace-
ment rates were paid. In addition to this, the speed of population aging creates 
unequal redistribution and problems for the pension system (Tinios, 2016).
In the 2016 sustainable governance report, it is emphasized that the pension system in 
Greece is unsustainable. The reason for this is that there are many opportunities for 
early retirement and a large of citizens who pay low pension. In 2011, fewer than 40% 
of Greeks who were 55 to 64 were still working and this is a disadvantage for the 
system. Furthermore, Greece has a high replacement rate. This represents that ratio of 
retirement pensions to contributions during work. While for workers with average 
earnings, the gross replacement rate averages 57% in the 34 OECD countries, in 
Greece, the replacement rate was more than 95% in 2011. Although, the normal pen-
sion age in Greece is 65, the early retirement option and pension ages for women re-
duce the will to work. In Greece, both the “income effect” from a high level of pension 
wealth and the “substitution effect” from reductions in pension wealth from working 
until age 65 motivates people to leave working life (OECD, 2011).
Greece has had to cut pension payments, decrease family benefits and raise the 
retriment age due to the crisis, causing a decline in overall social expenditures.
5 data, eMPIrIcal and analYtIcal fraMeWorK
In the empirical part of the study, the effects of indicators determining the political 
structure of Greece on the volume of social expenditures will be investigated by 
the time series methods for the period between 1980 and 2014. 
The study is based on 3 hypotheses.
1) Social expenditures increase in proportion to political fractionalization and 
the number of changes in the governments.
2)  Ideological differences and changes in the opinion of the cabinet increase 
social expenditures.
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370 Political indicators used in the study were extracted from the Comparative Politi-
cal Data Set (CPDS). The CPDS is a political and institutional dataset prepared 
annually by the researchers of Bern University since 1960. Although the data for 
Greece began in 1960 in the CPDS, the starting year for the study was based on 
1980. The reason for this is the lack of access to the social expenditure data for 
Greece before 1980.
The variables, definitions and data sources to be used in the time series analysis 
aiming to specify the relation between the social expenditures and the political 
indicators are given in table 1.
As inferred from table 1, Social Expenditures/GDP (SOC) was taken from OECD 
Social Expenditure Dataset while Cabinet Composition (Gov_party), Ideological 
Gap(Gov_gap), Number of Changes in the Government (Gov_chan), Index of 
electoral fractionalization of the party system(Rae-ele), Voter Turnout(Vturn) 
Election (Elect), Public Debt/GDP(Debt), Population over 65, as a percentage of 
population (Eld) were extracted from the Comparative Political Dataset (CPDS). 
Time series analysis was conducted to show to what extent social expenditures 
were affected by political indicators in Greece for the 1980-2014 period. The anal-
ysis was conducted in EViews 9. We first tested whether the series have unit root 
in the empirical part of our work by employing the augmented Dickey Fuller test 
(ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979; Dickey and Fuller, 1981). Three ADF models 
(the first with trend and intercept; the second with intercept and the third without 
trend and intercept) will be tested. According to the results from these tests, we 
will check whether the series have significant trends or intercepts.
Table 2
ADF test results
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371Since the soc variable contains a deterministic trend, the difference extraction 
process is applied to eliminate the trend. s_g is denoted as the new derived varia-
ble. For the 1st, 2nd and 3rd models, the critical values at 5% significance level are 
-3.56, -2.96 and -1.95, respectively. As the lneld and rae_ele variables contain a 
significant deterministic trend under the unit root hypothesis, the test statistics 
obtained are compared with the critical values of t rather than the ADF critical 
values. In this case the unit root for both variables can be rejected. All variables 
are stationary at level (i.e., they are all I(0))1. 
The regression equation to be estimated is given below in equation 1:
S_G =  β0 + β1 RAE_ELE + β2 LNVTURN + β3 LNELD + β4 LNDEBT + 
β
5
 GOV_PARTY + β6 GOV_GAP + β7 GOV_CHAN + β8 ELECT + 
β
9
 DEFICIT + ϵ (1)
The model estimated by the least squares method, standard linear regression pro-





Variable Coefficient std. error t-statistic Prob. 
RAE_ELE -2.4359 5.7531 -0.4234 0.6761
LNVTURN  6.0825 3.3630 -1.8086  0.0842*
LNELD  6.1479 2.0586  2.9864   0.0068**
LNDEBT -1.9069 0.5424 -3.5159   0.0019**
GOV_PARTY -0.1823 0.0962 -1.8952  0.0713*
GOV_GAP  0.1794 0.1169  1.5347 0.1391
GOV_CHAN  0.5749 0.3343  1.7196  0.0995*
ELECT -0.3704 0.4958 -0.7471 0.4629
DEFICIT -0.0576 0.0616 -0.9359 0.3595
C     20.3649    16.0078  1.2722 0.2166
R-squared  0.5878 Mean dependent var 0.5656
Adjusted R-squared  0.4191 S.D. dependent var 0.8601
S.E. of regression  0.6555 Akaike info criterion 2.2435
Sum squared resid  9.4534 Schwarz criterion 2.7016
Log likelihood    -25.8962 Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.3953
F-statistic  3.4853 Durbin-Watson stat 2.3651
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0081
In the above model, the lneld and lndebt variables are statistically significant at the 
5% significance level. The variables lnvturn and gov_party are statistically sig-
1 lneld and rae_ele test results for the significance of the trend are 8.068 and 7.074 respectively. The critical 
value at 5% for this test is 5.18. According to this results, these two series have deterministic trend. For this 
reason their t-statistics obtained from the ADF test will follow normal distribution for the first ADF model 
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372 nificant at the level of 10 percent significance. The results of the analysis indicate 
that voter turnout, spending on the elderly population and the number of govern-
ment changes, a proxy for political instability, have positive and statistically sig-
nificant effects on social expenditures while debt stock and cabinet composition 
have negative effects. However, the negative effects of the index of electoral frac-
tionalization of the party system, elections, budget deficit and the positive effects 
of ideological gap on the level on the social expenditures was not found to be 
statistically significant. 
6 concludInG reMarKs
OECD (2017) defines social expenditure as follows: Social expenditure is the pro-
vision by public (and private) institutions of benefits to, and financial contribu-
tions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support during 
circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of 
the benefits and financial contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a 
particular good or service nor an individual contract or transfer. Undoubtedly, 
this multi-dimensioned concepts is greatly influenced by political indicators. 
Three hypotheses have been tested by time series techniques in this study, which 
examined the extent to which social expenditures were influenced by political in-
dicators in Greece for the period 1980-2014.
The first hypothesis in the study was partially confirmed. In this context, the num-
ber of government changes, a proxy for political instability, has positive and sta-
tistically significant effects on social expenditures. This result confirms theoretical 
expectations and the results of previous studies. For all that, the negative but sta-
tistically insignificant effects of the index of electoral fractionalization of the 
party system were observed in Greece. In our opinion, this insignificant relation 
arises from the lack of any relationship between the ideology of the governments 
and the policies conducted in Greece. One should keep in mind that the PASOK 
government in the 1980s pursued both and left and right wing policies. However, 
in 2012, Prime Minister George Papandreou from a left wing party, implemented 
an austerity policy, because of the current situation in the country and the deci-
sions taken by the EU Commission. Also, SYRIZA, which came to power in 
2015, had to compromise its ideological stance for Greece to resolve economic 
problems.
The second hypothesis was not confirmed in our study. Our theoretical expecta-
tion was the positive relationship between social expenditures and ideological 
differences and changes in the opinion of the cabinet. The results of the analysis 
verify the positive effects of ideological gap on the level on the social expendi-
tures but this relationship was not found to be statistically significant. On the 
other hand, in contrast to theoretical expectations, cabinet composition has nega-
tive and statistically significant negative effects on the level of social expenditures 
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373to Greece’s understanding of the state. Esping-Andersen (1990), for instance, 
classifies Greece as a social welfare state, providing social and economic services 
for welfare maximization purposes. With this act, it can be stated that although 
there were changes in the cabinet, social expenditures increased due to the settled 
perception of the state in Greece.
In relation to the third hypothesis, while the positive impact of voter turnout on 
social spending was clearly observed, no findings were found to indicate the effect 
of the elections on the volume of social expenditures. This evidence validates the 
hypothesis that during the election times, governments in Greece do not employ 
social expenditures as a policy instrument. 
Regarding control variables, not surprisingly, a positive and robust relationship 
was observed between the population over 65 as a percentage of total population. 
This finding was in accord with our expectation, as early retirement opportunities 
and comprehensive social security expenditures were prominent in the specified 
period. While debt stock and budget deficit have negative effects, only the former 
has a statistically significant relationship. 
According to OECD Report (OECD, 2013), Greece as a social welfare state fol-
lows complex, fragmentary welfare system without a clear strategy. Despite re-
forms made in the system, the desired success have not been attained. This situa-
tion is an indicator that the system needs to be revised. Reforms under the Minis-
try of Labour, Social Security and Welfare should continue and provide a coherent 
strategy for efficient and effective social welfare policy and public governance. 
These results and observations confirm that Greece has a peculiar political struc-
ture and social spending system.
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